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Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

JA
John Allen
Sat, Aug 12, 2017 9:23 PM

FYI, John K1AE

-----Original Message-----
From: YCCC [mailto:yccc-bounces@contesting.com] On Behalf Of ROBERT DOHERTY
Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 9:26 AM
To: YCCC Reflector
Subject: [YCCC] Fwd: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

As if there were not enough problems in the world .....

Whitey  K1VV

 Date: August 12, 2017 at 7:37 AM
 Subject: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

 Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

 News from: New Scientis (article reported by R/O Luca Milone – IZ7GEG)

 https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share


 On date: 10 August 2017

 By David Hambling


 Reports of satellite navigation problems in the Black Sea suggest that Russia may be testing a new system for spoofing GPS, New Scientist has learned. This could be the first hint of a new form of electronic warfare available to everyone from rogue nation states to petty criminals.


 On 22 June, the US Maritime Administration filed a seemingly bland incident report. The master of a ship off the Russian port of Novorossiysk had discovered his GPS put him in the wrong spot – more than 32 kilometres inland, at Gelendzhik Airport.


 After checking the navigation equipment was working properly, the captain contacted other nearby ships. Their AIS traces – signals from the automatic identification system used to track vessels – placed them all at the same airport. At least 20 ships were affected http://maritime-executive.com/editorials/mass-gps-spoofing-attack-in-black-sea .

  
 While the incident is not yet confirmed, experts think this is the first documented use of GPS misdirection – https://www.marad.dot.gov/msci/alert/2017/2017-005a-gps-interference-black-sea/  a spoofing attack that has long been warned of but never been seen in the wild.


 Until now, the biggest worry for GPS has been it can be jammed https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20202-gps-chaos-how-a-30-box-can-jam-your-life/  by masking the GPS satellite signal with noise. While this can cause chaos, it is also easy to detect. GPS receivers sound an alarm when they lose the signal due to jamming. Spoofing is more insidious: a false signal from a ground station simply confuses a satellite receiver. “Jamming just causes the receiver to die, spoofing causes the receiver to lie,” says consultant David Last http://www.professordavidlast.co.uk/ , former president of the UK’s Royal Institute of Navigation.


 Todd Humphreys http://www.ae.utexas.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/humphreys , of the University of Texas at Austin, has been warning of the coming danger of GPS spoofing for many years. In 2013, he showed how a superyacht with state-of-the-art navigation could be lured off-course by GPS spoofing. “The receiver’s behaviour in the Black Sea incident was much like during the controlled attacks http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/navi.183/full  my team conducted,” says Humphreys.


 Humphreys thinks this is Russia experimenting with a new form of electronic warfare. Over the past year, GPS spoofing has been causing chaos for the receivers on phone apps in central Moscow to misbehave https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-kremlin-eats-gps-for-breakfast-55823 . The scale of the problem did not become apparent until people began trying to play Pokemon Go. The fake signal, which seems to centre on the Kremlin, relocates anyone nearby to Vnukovo Airport http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2017/01/bizarre-gps-spoofing-means-drivers-near-kremlin-always-airport/ , 32 km away. This is probably for defensive reasons; many NATO guided bombs, missiles and drones rely on GPS navigation, and successful spoofing would make it impossible for them to hit their targets.


 But now the geolocation interference is being used far away from the Kremlin. Some worry that this means that spoofing is getting easier. GPS spoofing previously required considerable technical expertise. Humphreys had to build his first spoofer from scratch in 2008, but notes that it can now be done with commercial hardware and software downloaded from the Internet.


 Nor does it require much power. Satellite signals are very weak – about 20 watts from 20,000 miles away – so a one-watt transmitter on a hilltop, plane or drone is enough to spoof everything out to the horizon.


 If the hardware and software are becoming more accessible, nation states soon won’t be the only ones using the technology. This is within the scope of any competent hacker http://www.comsoc.org/ctn/lost-space-how-secure-future-mobile-positioning . There have not yet been any authenticated reports of criminal spoofing, but it should not be difficult for criminals to use it to divert a driverless vehicle https://www.newscientist.com/article/2142059-sneaky-attacks-trick-ais-into-seeing-or-hearing-whats-not-there/  or drone delivery, or to hijack an autonomous ship. Spoofing will give everyone affected the same location, so a hijacker would just need a short-ranged system to affect one vehicle.


 But Humphreys believes that spoofing by a state operator is the more serious threat. “It affects safety-of-life operations over a large area,” he says. “In congested waters with poor weather, such as the English Channel, it would likely cause great confusion, and probably collisions.”


 Last says that the Black Sea incident suggests a new device capable of causing widespread disruption, for example, if used in the ongoing dispute with Ukraine. “My gut feeling is that this is a test of a system which will be used in anger at some other time.”


 73’s
 webmaster

YCCC Reflector mailto:yccc@contesting.com
Yankee Clipper Contest Club  http://www.yccc.org
Reflector Info: http://lists.contesting.com/mailman/listinfo/yccc


This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
https://www.avast.com/antivirus

FYI, John K1AE -----Original Message----- From: YCCC [mailto:yccc-bounces@contesting.com] On Behalf Of ROBERT DOHERTY Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 9:26 AM To: YCCC Reflector Subject: [YCCC] Fwd: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon As if there were not enough problems in the world ..... Whitey K1VV > Date: August 12, 2017 at 7:37 AM > Subject: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > News from: New Scientis (article reported by R/O Luca Milone – IZ7GEG) > > https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share > > > On date: 10 August 2017 > > By David Hambling > > > Reports of satellite navigation problems in the Black Sea suggest that Russia may be testing a new system for spoofing GPS, New Scientist has learned. This could be the first hint of a new form of electronic warfare available to everyone from rogue nation states to petty criminals. > > > On 22 June, the US Maritime Administration filed a seemingly bland incident report. The master of a ship off the Russian port of Novorossiysk had discovered his GPS put him in the wrong spot – more than 32 kilometres inland, at Gelendzhik Airport. > > > After checking the navigation equipment was working properly, the captain contacted other nearby ships. Their AIS traces – signals from the automatic identification system used to track vessels – placed them all at the same airport. At least 20 ships were affected http://maritime-executive.com/editorials/mass-gps-spoofing-attack-in-black-sea . > > > While the incident is not yet confirmed, experts think this is the first documented use of GPS misdirection – https://www.marad.dot.gov/msci/alert/2017/2017-005a-gps-interference-black-sea/ a spoofing attack that has long been warned of but never been seen in the wild. > > > Until now, the biggest worry for GPS has been it can be jammed https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20202-gps-chaos-how-a-30-box-can-jam-your-life/ by masking the GPS satellite signal with noise. While this can cause chaos, it is also easy to detect. GPS receivers sound an alarm when they lose the signal due to jamming. Spoofing is more insidious: a false signal from a ground station simply confuses a satellite receiver. “Jamming just causes the receiver to die, spoofing causes the receiver to lie,” says consultant David Last http://www.professordavidlast.co.uk/ , former president of the UK’s Royal Institute of Navigation. > > > Todd Humphreys http://www.ae.utexas.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/humphreys , of the University of Texas at Austin, has been warning of the coming danger of GPS spoofing for many years. In 2013, he showed how a superyacht with state-of-the-art navigation could be lured off-course by GPS spoofing. “The receiver’s behaviour in the Black Sea incident was much like during the controlled attacks http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/navi.183/full my team conducted,” says Humphreys. > > > Humphreys thinks this is Russia experimenting with a new form of electronic warfare. Over the past year, GPS spoofing has been causing chaos for the receivers on phone apps in central Moscow to misbehave https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-kremlin-eats-gps-for-breakfast-55823 . The scale of the problem did not become apparent until people began trying to play Pokemon Go. The fake signal, which seems to centre on the Kremlin, relocates anyone nearby to Vnukovo Airport http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2017/01/bizarre-gps-spoofing-means-drivers-near-kremlin-always-airport/ , 32 km away. This is probably for defensive reasons; many NATO guided bombs, missiles and drones rely on GPS navigation, and successful spoofing would make it impossible for them to hit their targets. > > > But now the geolocation interference is being used far away from the Kremlin. Some worry that this means that spoofing is getting easier. GPS spoofing previously required considerable technical expertise. Humphreys had to build his first spoofer from scratch in 2008, but notes that it can now be done with commercial hardware and software downloaded from the Internet. > > > Nor does it require much power. Satellite signals are very weak – about 20 watts from 20,000 miles away – so a one-watt transmitter on a hilltop, plane or drone is enough to spoof everything out to the horizon. > > > If the hardware and software are becoming more accessible, nation states soon won’t be the only ones using the technology. This is within the scope of any competent hacker http://www.comsoc.org/ctn/lost-space-how-secure-future-mobile-positioning . There have not yet been any authenticated reports of criminal spoofing, but it should not be difficult for criminals to use it to divert a driverless vehicle https://www.newscientist.com/article/2142059-sneaky-attacks-trick-ais-into-seeing-or-hearing-whats-not-there/ or drone delivery, or to hijack an autonomous ship. Spoofing will give everyone affected the same location, so a hijacker would just need a short-ranged system to affect one vehicle. > > > But Humphreys believes that spoofing by a state operator is the more serious threat. “It affects safety-of-life operations over a large area,” he says. “In congested waters with poor weather, such as the English Channel, it would likely cause great confusion, and probably collisions.” > > > Last says that the Black Sea incident suggests a new device capable of causing widespread disruption, for example, if used in the ongoing dispute with Ukraine. “My gut feeling is that this is a test of a system which will be used in anger at some other time.” > > > 73’s > webmaster _______________________________________________ YCCC Reflector mailto:yccc@contesting.com Yankee Clipper Contest Club http://www.yccc.org Reflector Info: http://lists.contesting.com/mailman/listinfo/yccc --- This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus
CJ
Clint Jay
Mon, Aug 14, 2017 5:46 AM

Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the
shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago?

On 12 August 2017 at 22:23, John Allen john@pcsupportsolutions.com wrote:

FYI, John K1AE

-----Original Message-----
From: YCCC [mailto:yccc-bounces@contesting.com] On Behalf Of ROBERT
DOHERTY
Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 9:26 AM
To: YCCC Reflector
Subject: [YCCC] Fwd: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing
attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

As if there were not enough problems in the world .....

Whitey  K1VV

 Date: August 12, 2017 at 7:37 AM
 Subject: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing

attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

 Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

 News from: New Scientis (article reported by R/O Luca Milone –

IZ7GEG)

 https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled-

in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.
WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share https://www.newscientist.com/
article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack-
suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share

 On date: 10 August 2017

 By David Hambling


 Reports of satellite navigation problems in the Black Sea suggest

that Russia may be testing a new system for spoofing GPS, New Scientist has
learned. This could be the first hint of a new form of electronic warfare
available to everyone from rogue nation states to petty criminals.

 On 22 June, the US Maritime Administration filed a seemingly bland

incident report. The master of a ship off the Russian port of Novorossiysk
had discovered his GPS put him in the wrong spot – more than 32 kilometres
inland, at Gelendzhik Airport.

 After checking the navigation equipment was working properly, the

captain contacted other nearby ships. Their AIS traces – signals from the
automatic identification system used to track vessels – placed them all at
the same airport. At least 20 ships were affected
http://maritime-executive.com/editorials/mass-gps-spoofing-
attack-in-black-sea .

 While the incident is not yet confirmed, experts think this is the

first documented use of GPS misdirection – https://www.marad.dot.gov/
msci/alert/2017/2017-005a-gps-interference-black-sea/  a spoofing attack
that has long been warned of but never been seen in the wild.

 Until now, the biggest worry for GPS has been it can be jammed

https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20202-gps-chaos-how-
a-30-box-can-jam-your-life/  by masking the GPS satellite signal with
noise. While this can cause chaos, it is also easy to detect. GPS receivers
sound an alarm when they lose the signal due to jamming. Spoofing is more
insidious: a false signal from a ground station simply confuses a satellite
receiver. “Jamming just causes the receiver to die, spoofing causes the
receiver to lie,” says consultant David Last
http://www.professordavidlast.co.uk/ , former president of the UK’s Royal
Institute of Navigation.

 Todd Humphreys http://www.ae.utexas.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/

humphreys , of the University of Texas at Austin, has been warning of the
coming danger of GPS spoofing for many years. In 2013, he showed how a
superyacht with state-of-the-art navigation could be lured off-course by
GPS spoofing. “The receiver’s behaviour in the Black Sea incident was much
like during the controlled attacks http://onlinelibrary.wiley.
com/doi/10.1002/navi.183/full  my team conducted,” says Humphreys.

 Humphreys thinks this is Russia experimenting with a new form of

electronic warfare. Over the past year, GPS spoofing has been causing chaos
for the receivers on phone apps in central Moscow to misbehave
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-kremlin-eats-gps-
for-breakfast-55823 . The scale of the problem did not become apparent
until people began trying to play Pokemon Go. The fake signal, which seems
to centre on the Kremlin, relocates anyone nearby to Vnukovo Airport
http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2017/01/bizarre-gps-
spoofing-means-drivers-near-kremlin-always-airport/ , 32 km away. This is
probably for defensive reasons; many NATO guided bombs, missiles and drones
rely on GPS navigation, and successful spoofing would make it impossible
for them to hit their targets.

 But now the geolocation interference is being used far away from the

Kremlin. Some worry that this means that spoofing is getting easier. GPS
spoofing previously required considerable technical expertise. Humphreys
had to build his first spoofer from scratch in 2008, but notes that it can
now be done with commercial hardware and software downloaded from the
Internet.

 Nor does it require much power. Satellite signals are very weak –

about 20 watts from 20,000 miles away – so a one-watt transmitter on a
hilltop, plane or drone is enough to spoof everything out to the horizon.

 If the hardware and software are becoming more accessible, nation

states soon won’t be the only ones using the technology. This is within the
scope of any competent hacker http://www.comsoc.org/ctn/
lost-space-how-secure-future-mobile-positioning . There have not yet been
any authenticated reports of criminal spoofing, but it should not be
difficult for criminals to use it to divert a driverless vehicle
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2142059-sneaky-
attacks-trick-ais-into-seeing-or-hearing-whats-not-there/  or drone
delivery, or to hijack an autonomous ship. Spoofing will give everyone
affected the same location, so a hijacker would just need a short-ranged
system to affect one vehicle.

 But Humphreys believes that spoofing by a state operator is the more

serious threat. “It affects safety-of-life operations over a large area,”
he says. “In congested waters with poor weather, such as the English
Channel, it would likely cause great confusion, and probably collisions.”

 Last says that the Black Sea incident suggests a new device capable

of causing widespread disruption, for example, if used in the ongoing
dispute with Ukraine. “My gut feeling is that this is a test of a system
which will be used in anger at some other time.”

 73’s
 webmaster

YCCC Reflector mailto:yccc@contesting.com
Yankee Clipper Contest Club  http://www.yccc.org
Reflector Info: http://lists.contesting.com/mailman/listinfo/yccc


This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
https://www.avast.com/antivirus


time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com
To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/
mailman/listinfo/time-nuts
and follow the instructions there.

--
Clint.

No trees were harmed in the sending of this mail. However, a large number
of electrons were greatly inconvenienced.

Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago? On 12 August 2017 at 22:23, John Allen <john@pcsupportsolutions.com> wrote: > FYI, John K1AE > > -----Original Message----- > From: YCCC [mailto:yccc-bounces@contesting.com] On Behalf Of ROBERT > DOHERTY > Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 9:26 AM > To: YCCC Reflector > Subject: [YCCC] Fwd: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing > attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > As if there were not enough problems in the world ..... > > Whitey K1VV > > > Date: August 12, 2017 at 7:37 AM > > Subject: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing > attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > > > Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > > > News from: New Scientis (article reported by R/O Luca Milone – > IZ7GEG) > > > > https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled- > in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#. > WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share https://www.newscientist.com/ > article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack- > suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share > > > > > > On date: 10 August 2017 > > > > By David Hambling > > > > > > Reports of satellite navigation problems in the Black Sea suggest > that Russia may be testing a new system for spoofing GPS, New Scientist has > learned. This could be the first hint of a new form of electronic warfare > available to everyone from rogue nation states to petty criminals. > > > > > > On 22 June, the US Maritime Administration filed a seemingly bland > incident report. The master of a ship off the Russian port of Novorossiysk > had discovered his GPS put him in the wrong spot – more than 32 kilometres > inland, at Gelendzhik Airport. > > > > > > After checking the navigation equipment was working properly, the > captain contacted other nearby ships. Their AIS traces – signals from the > automatic identification system used to track vessels – placed them all at > the same airport. At least 20 ships were affected > http://maritime-executive.com/editorials/mass-gps-spoofing- > attack-in-black-sea . > > > > > > While the incident is not yet confirmed, experts think this is the > first documented use of GPS misdirection – https://www.marad.dot.gov/ > msci/alert/2017/2017-005a-gps-interference-black-sea/ a spoofing attack > that has long been warned of but never been seen in the wild. > > > > > > Until now, the biggest worry for GPS has been it can be jammed > https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20202-gps-chaos-how- > a-30-box-can-jam-your-life/ by masking the GPS satellite signal with > noise. While this can cause chaos, it is also easy to detect. GPS receivers > sound an alarm when they lose the signal due to jamming. Spoofing is more > insidious: a false signal from a ground station simply confuses a satellite > receiver. “Jamming just causes the receiver to die, spoofing causes the > receiver to lie,” says consultant David Last > http://www.professordavidlast.co.uk/ , former president of the UK’s Royal > Institute of Navigation. > > > > > > Todd Humphreys http://www.ae.utexas.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/ > humphreys , of the University of Texas at Austin, has been warning of the > coming danger of GPS spoofing for many years. In 2013, he showed how a > superyacht with state-of-the-art navigation could be lured off-course by > GPS spoofing. “The receiver’s behaviour in the Black Sea incident was much > like during the controlled attacks http://onlinelibrary.wiley. > com/doi/10.1002/navi.183/full my team conducted,” says Humphreys. > > > > > > Humphreys thinks this is Russia experimenting with a new form of > electronic warfare. Over the past year, GPS spoofing has been causing chaos > for the receivers on phone apps in central Moscow to misbehave > https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-kremlin-eats-gps- > for-breakfast-55823 . The scale of the problem did not become apparent > until people began trying to play Pokemon Go. The fake signal, which seems > to centre on the Kremlin, relocates anyone nearby to Vnukovo Airport > http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2017/01/bizarre-gps- > spoofing-means-drivers-near-kremlin-always-airport/ , 32 km away. This is > probably for defensive reasons; many NATO guided bombs, missiles and drones > rely on GPS navigation, and successful spoofing would make it impossible > for them to hit their targets. > > > > > > But now the geolocation interference is being used far away from the > Kremlin. Some worry that this means that spoofing is getting easier. GPS > spoofing previously required considerable technical expertise. Humphreys > had to build his first spoofer from scratch in 2008, but notes that it can > now be done with commercial hardware and software downloaded from the > Internet. > > > > > > Nor does it require much power. Satellite signals are very weak – > about 20 watts from 20,000 miles away – so a one-watt transmitter on a > hilltop, plane or drone is enough to spoof everything out to the horizon. > > > > > > If the hardware and software are becoming more accessible, nation > states soon won’t be the only ones using the technology. This is within the > scope of any competent hacker http://www.comsoc.org/ctn/ > lost-space-how-secure-future-mobile-positioning . There have not yet been > any authenticated reports of criminal spoofing, but it should not be > difficult for criminals to use it to divert a driverless vehicle > https://www.newscientist.com/article/2142059-sneaky- > attacks-trick-ais-into-seeing-or-hearing-whats-not-there/ or drone > delivery, or to hijack an autonomous ship. Spoofing will give everyone > affected the same location, so a hijacker would just need a short-ranged > system to affect one vehicle. > > > > > > But Humphreys believes that spoofing by a state operator is the more > serious threat. “It affects safety-of-life operations over a large area,” > he says. “In congested waters with poor weather, such as the English > Channel, it would likely cause great confusion, and probably collisions.” > > > > > > Last says that the Black Sea incident suggests a new device capable > of causing widespread disruption, for example, if used in the ongoing > dispute with Ukraine. “My gut feeling is that this is a test of a system > which will be used in anger at some other time.” > > > > > > 73’s > > webmaster > _______________________________________________ > YCCC Reflector mailto:yccc@contesting.com > Yankee Clipper Contest Club http://www.yccc.org > Reflector Info: http://lists.contesting.com/mailman/listinfo/yccc > > > > --- > This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. > https://www.avast.com/antivirus > > _______________________________________________ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. > -- Clint. *No trees were harmed in the sending of this mail. However, a large number of electrons were greatly inconvenienced.*
BB
Bill Byrom
Mon, Aug 14, 2017 6:11 AM

This has been an area of interest to the US Air Force for many years:

http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2006-10-18/usaf-facility-tests-gps-jamming-vulnerability

--
Bill Byrom N5BB

On Mon, Aug 14, 2017, at 12:46 AM, Clint Jay wrote:

Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the
shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago?

On 12 August 2017 at 22:23, John Allen john@pcsupportsolutions.com
wrote:

FYI, John K1AE

-----Original Message-----
From: YCCC [mailto:yccc-bounces@contesting.com] On Behalf Of ROBERT
DOHERTY
Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 9:26 AM
To: YCCC Reflector
Subject: [YCCC] Fwd: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing
attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

As if there were not enough problems in the world .....

Whitey  K1VV

 Date: August 12, 2017 at 7:37 AM
 Subject: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing

attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

 Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon

 News from: New Scientis (article reported by R/O Luca Milone –

IZ7GEG)

 https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled-

in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.
WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share https://www.newscientist.com/
article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack-
suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share

 On date: 10 August 2017

 By David Hambling


 Reports of satellite navigation problems in the Black Sea suggest

that Russia may be testing a new system for spoofing GPS, New Scientist has
learned. This could be the first hint of a new form of electronic warfare
available to everyone from rogue nation states to petty criminals.

 On 22 June, the US Maritime Administration filed a seemingly bland

incident report. The master of a ship off the Russian port of Novorossiysk
had discovered his GPS put him in the wrong spot – more than 32 kilometres
inland, at Gelendzhik Airport.

 After checking the navigation equipment was working properly, the

captain contacted other nearby ships. Their AIS traces – signals from the
automatic identification system used to track vessels – placed them all at
the same airport. At least 20 ships were affected
http://maritime-executive.com/editorials/mass-gps-spoofing-
attack-in-black-sea .

 While the incident is not yet confirmed, experts think this is the

first documented use of GPS misdirection – https://www.marad.dot.gov/
msci/alert/2017/2017-005a-gps-interference-black-sea/  a spoofing attack
that has long been warned of but never been seen in the wild.

 Until now, the biggest worry for GPS has been it can be jammed

https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20202-gps-chaos-how-
a-30-box-can-jam-your-life/  by masking the GPS satellite signal with
noise. While this can cause chaos, it is also easy to detect. GPS receivers
sound an alarm when they lose the signal due to jamming. Spoofing is more
insidious: a false signal from a ground station simply confuses a satellite
receiver. “Jamming just causes the receiver to die, spoofing causes the
receiver to lie,” says consultant David Last
http://www.professordavidlast.co.uk/ , former president of the UK’s Royal
Institute of Navigation.

 Todd Humphreys http://www.ae.utexas.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/

humphreys , of the University of Texas at Austin, has been warning of the
coming danger of GPS spoofing for many years. In 2013, he showed how a
superyacht with state-of-the-art navigation could be lured off-course by
GPS spoofing. “The receiver’s behaviour in the Black Sea incident was much
like during the controlled attacks http://onlinelibrary.wiley.
com/doi/10.1002/navi.183/full  my team conducted,” says Humphreys.

 Humphreys thinks this is Russia experimenting with a new form of

electronic warfare. Over the past year, GPS spoofing has been causing chaos
for the receivers on phone apps in central Moscow to misbehave
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-kremlin-eats-gps-
for-breakfast-55823 . The scale of the problem did not become apparent
until people began trying to play Pokemon Go. The fake signal, which seems
to centre on the Kremlin, relocates anyone nearby to Vnukovo Airport
http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2017/01/bizarre-gps-
spoofing-means-drivers-near-kremlin-always-airport/ , 32 km away. This is
probably for defensive reasons; many NATO guided bombs, missiles and drones
rely on GPS navigation, and successful spoofing would make it impossible
for them to hit their targets.

 But now the geolocation interference is being used far away from the

Kremlin. Some worry that this means that spoofing is getting easier. GPS
spoofing previously required considerable technical expertise. Humphreys
had to build his first spoofer from scratch in 2008, but notes that it can
now be done with commercial hardware and software downloaded from the
Internet.

 Nor does it require much power. Satellite signals are very weak –

about 20 watts from 20,000 miles away – so a one-watt transmitter on a
hilltop, plane or drone is enough to spoof everything out to the horizon.

 If the hardware and software are becoming more accessible, nation

states soon won’t be the only ones using the technology. This is within the
scope of any competent hacker http://www.comsoc.org/ctn/
lost-space-how-secure-future-mobile-positioning . There have not yet been
any authenticated reports of criminal spoofing, but it should not be
difficult for criminals to use it to divert a driverless vehicle
https://www.newscientist.com/article/2142059-sneaky-
attacks-trick-ais-into-seeing-or-hearing-whats-not-there/  or drone
delivery, or to hijack an autonomous ship. Spoofing will give everyone
affected the same location, so a hijacker would just need a short-ranged
system to affect one vehicle.

 But Humphreys believes that spoofing by a state operator is the more

serious threat. “It affects safety-of-life operations over a large area,”
he says. “In congested waters with poor weather, such as the English
Channel, it would likely cause great confusion, and probably collisions.”

 Last says that the Black Sea incident suggests a new device capable

of causing widespread disruption, for example, if used in the ongoing
dispute with Ukraine. “My gut feeling is that this is a test of a system
which will be used in anger at some other time.”

 73’s
 webmaster

YCCC Reflector mailto:yccc@contesting.com
Yankee Clipper Contest Club  http://www.yccc.org
Reflector Info: http://lists.contesting.com/mailman/listinfo/yccc


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No trees were harmed in the sending of this mail. However, a large
number
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This has been an area of interest to the US Air Force for many years: http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2006-10-18/usaf-facility-tests-gps-jamming-vulnerability -- Bill Byrom N5BB On Mon, Aug 14, 2017, at 12:46 AM, Clint Jay wrote: > Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the > shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago? > > > > On 12 August 2017 at 22:23, John Allen <john@pcsupportsolutions.com> > wrote: > > > FYI, John K1AE > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: YCCC [mailto:yccc-bounces@contesting.com] On Behalf Of ROBERT > > DOHERTY > > Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 9:26 AM > > To: YCCC Reflector > > Subject: [YCCC] Fwd: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing > > attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > > > As if there were not enough problems in the world ..... > > > > Whitey K1VV > > > > > Date: August 12, 2017 at 7:37 AM > > > Subject: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing > > attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > > > > > Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > > > > > News from: New Scientis (article reported by R/O Luca Milone – > > IZ7GEG) > > > > > > https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled- > > in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#. > > WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share https://www.newscientist.com/ > > article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack- > > suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share > > > > > > > > > On date: 10 August 2017 > > > > > > By David Hambling > > > > > > > > > Reports of satellite navigation problems in the Black Sea suggest > > that Russia may be testing a new system for spoofing GPS, New Scientist has > > learned. This could be the first hint of a new form of electronic warfare > > available to everyone from rogue nation states to petty criminals. > > > > > > > > > On 22 June, the US Maritime Administration filed a seemingly bland > > incident report. The master of a ship off the Russian port of Novorossiysk > > had discovered his GPS put him in the wrong spot – more than 32 kilometres > > inland, at Gelendzhik Airport. > > > > > > > > > After checking the navigation equipment was working properly, the > > captain contacted other nearby ships. Their AIS traces – signals from the > > automatic identification system used to track vessels – placed them all at > > the same airport. At least 20 ships were affected > > http://maritime-executive.com/editorials/mass-gps-spoofing- > > attack-in-black-sea . > > > > > > > > > While the incident is not yet confirmed, experts think this is the > > first documented use of GPS misdirection – https://www.marad.dot.gov/ > > msci/alert/2017/2017-005a-gps-interference-black-sea/ a spoofing attack > > that has long been warned of but never been seen in the wild. > > > > > > > > > Until now, the biggest worry for GPS has been it can be jammed > > https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20202-gps-chaos-how- > > a-30-box-can-jam-your-life/ by masking the GPS satellite signal with > > noise. While this can cause chaos, it is also easy to detect. GPS receivers > > sound an alarm when they lose the signal due to jamming. Spoofing is more > > insidious: a false signal from a ground station simply confuses a satellite > > receiver. “Jamming just causes the receiver to die, spoofing causes the > > receiver to lie,” says consultant David Last > > http://www.professordavidlast.co.uk/ , former president of the UK’s Royal > > Institute of Navigation. > > > > > > > > > Todd Humphreys http://www.ae.utexas.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/ > > humphreys , of the University of Texas at Austin, has been warning of the > > coming danger of GPS spoofing for many years. In 2013, he showed how a > > superyacht with state-of-the-art navigation could be lured off-course by > > GPS spoofing. “The receiver’s behaviour in the Black Sea incident was much > > like during the controlled attacks http://onlinelibrary.wiley. > > com/doi/10.1002/navi.183/full my team conducted,” says Humphreys. > > > > > > > > > Humphreys thinks this is Russia experimenting with a new form of > > electronic warfare. Over the past year, GPS spoofing has been causing chaos > > for the receivers on phone apps in central Moscow to misbehave > > https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-kremlin-eats-gps- > > for-breakfast-55823 . The scale of the problem did not become apparent > > until people began trying to play Pokemon Go. The fake signal, which seems > > to centre on the Kremlin, relocates anyone nearby to Vnukovo Airport > > http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2017/01/bizarre-gps- > > spoofing-means-drivers-near-kremlin-always-airport/ , 32 km away. This is > > probably for defensive reasons; many NATO guided bombs, missiles and drones > > rely on GPS navigation, and successful spoofing would make it impossible > > for them to hit their targets. > > > > > > > > > But now the geolocation interference is being used far away from the > > Kremlin. Some worry that this means that spoofing is getting easier. GPS > > spoofing previously required considerable technical expertise. Humphreys > > had to build his first spoofer from scratch in 2008, but notes that it can > > now be done with commercial hardware and software downloaded from the > > Internet. > > > > > > > > > Nor does it require much power. Satellite signals are very weak – > > about 20 watts from 20,000 miles away – so a one-watt transmitter on a > > hilltop, plane or drone is enough to spoof everything out to the horizon. > > > > > > > > > If the hardware and software are becoming more accessible, nation > > states soon won’t be the only ones using the technology. This is within the > > scope of any competent hacker http://www.comsoc.org/ctn/ > > lost-space-how-secure-future-mobile-positioning . There have not yet been > > any authenticated reports of criminal spoofing, but it should not be > > difficult for criminals to use it to divert a driverless vehicle > > https://www.newscientist.com/article/2142059-sneaky- > > attacks-trick-ais-into-seeing-or-hearing-whats-not-there/ or drone > > delivery, or to hijack an autonomous ship. Spoofing will give everyone > > affected the same location, so a hijacker would just need a short-ranged > > system to affect one vehicle. > > > > > > > > > But Humphreys believes that spoofing by a state operator is the more > > serious threat. “It affects safety-of-life operations over a large area,” > > he says. “In congested waters with poor weather, such as the English > > Channel, it would likely cause great confusion, and probably collisions.” > > > > > > > > > Last says that the Black Sea incident suggests a new device capable > > of causing widespread disruption, for example, if used in the ongoing > > dispute with Ukraine. “My gut feeling is that this is a test of a system > > which will be used in anger at some other time.” > > > > > > > > > 73’s > > > webmaster > > _______________________________________________ > > YCCC Reflector mailto:yccc@contesting.com > > Yankee Clipper Contest Club http://www.yccc.org > > Reflector Info: http://lists.contesting.com/mailman/listinfo/yccc > > > > > > > > --- > > This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. > > https://www.avast.com/antivirus > > > > _______________________________________________ > > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > > and follow the instructions there. > > > > > > -- > Clint. > > *No trees were harmed in the sending of this mail. However, a large > number > of electrons were greatly inconvenienced.* > _______________________________________________ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to > https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there.
MB
Martin Burnicki
Mon, Aug 14, 2017 7:26 AM

Clint Jay wrote:

Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the
shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago?

Clint Jay wrote: > Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the > shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago? https://news.utexas.edu/2013/07/29/ut-austin-researchers-successfully-spoof-an-80-million-yacht-at-sea https://sofrep.com/46818/gps-spoofing-how-iran-tricked-us-patrol-boats-into-capture/ Martin
CJ
Clint Jay
Mon, Aug 14, 2017 8:33 AM

It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple of
students who used it to fool Pokémon go...

On 14 Aug 2017 8:27 am, "Martin Burnicki" martin.burnicki@burnicki.net
wrote:

Clint Jay wrote:

Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the
shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago?

https://news.utexas.edu/2013/07/29/ut-austin-researchers-
successfully-spoof-an-80-million-yacht-at-sea

https://sofrep.com/46818/gps-spoofing-how-iran-tricked-us-
patrol-boats-into-capture/

Martin


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It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple of students who used it to fool Pokémon go... On 14 Aug 2017 8:27 am, "Martin Burnicki" <martin.burnicki@burnicki.net> wrote: > Clint Jay wrote: > > Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the > > shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago? > > https://news.utexas.edu/2013/07/29/ut-austin-researchers- > successfully-spoof-an-80-million-yacht-at-sea > > https://sofrep.com/46818/gps-spoofing-how-iran-tricked-us- > patrol-boats-into-capture/ > > Martin > > _______________________________________________ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. >
MB
Martin Burnicki
Mon, Aug 14, 2017 9:03 AM

Clint Jay wrote:

It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple of
students who used it to fool Pokémon go...

Yes, I read about that, too. However, related to Pokémon go it's just
fun, but related to serious application it can cause quite some damage.

Clint Jay wrote: > It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple of > students who used it to fool Pokémon go... Yes, I read about that, too. However, related to Pokémon go it's just fun, but related to serious application it can cause quite some damage.
CJ
Clint Jay
Mon, Aug 14, 2017 9:26 AM

Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for
using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is
if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy
(obviously you'd need deep pockets).

That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and
would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and skill
to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrous consequences if
anyone decided to use it for malicious means but I'd be surprised if there
wasn't a turnkey solution available to anyone who has the funds.

On 14 Aug 2017 10:04 am, "Martin Burnicki" martin.burnicki@burnicki.net
wrote:

Clint Jay wrote:

It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple

of

students who used it to fool Pokémon go...

Yes, I read about that, too. However, related to Pokémon go it's just
fun, but related to serious application it can cause quite some damage.


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Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy (obviously you'd need deep pockets). That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and skill to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrous consequences if anyone decided to use it for malicious means but I'd be surprised if there wasn't a turnkey solution available to anyone who has the funds. On 14 Aug 2017 10:04 am, "Martin Burnicki" <martin.burnicki@burnicki.net> wrote: > Clint Jay wrote: > > It might have been a hoax but I'm sure I saw it demonstrated by a couple > of > > students who used it to fool Pokémon go... > > Yes, I read about that, too. However, related to Pokémon go it's just > fun, but related to serious application it can cause quite some damage. > > _______________________________________________ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. >
MB
Martin Burnicki
Mon, Aug 14, 2017 9:32 AM

Clint Jay wrote:

Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for
using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is
if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy
(obviously you'd need deep pockets).

That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and
would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and skill
to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrous consequences if
anyone decided to use it for malicious means but I'd be surprised if there
wasn't a turnkey solution available to anyone who has the funds.

I absolutely agree.

Clint Jay wrote: > Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for > using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is > if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy > (obviously you'd need deep pockets). > > That it can "so easily" be spoofed (it's not a trivial hack to spoof and > would, as far as I can see, take good knowledge of how GPS works and skill > to implement) is worrying and it could have disastrous consequences if > anyone decided to use it for malicious means but I'd be surprised if there > wasn't a turnkey solution available to anyone who has the funds. I absolutely agree.
MB
Martin Burnicki
Mon, Aug 14, 2017 9:42 AM

Clint Jay wrote:

Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for
using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is
if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy
(obviously you'd need deep pockets).

I just searched for "Pokémon GO GPS spoofing" on the 'net.

Looks like this was just a hack in Android where apps were provided with
a spoofed position from the hack instead of the true position determined
by the GPS/GNSS receiver.

So this is quite a different thing than spoofing the real GPS signals,
and it only affects the devices which have that hack installed.

Clint Jay wrote: > Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for > using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology is > if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can buy > (obviously you'd need deep pockets). I just searched for "Pokémon GO GPS spoofing" on the 'net. Looks like this was just a hack in Android where apps were provided with a spoofed position from the hack instead of the true position determined by the GPS/GNSS receiver. So this is quite a different thing than spoofing the real GPS signals, and it only affects the devices which have that hack installed.
CJ
Clint Jay
Mon, Aug 14, 2017 9:55 AM

No, this was not the software hack, it was done with some rather nice
Rohde&Schwarz test equipment.

On 14 Aug 2017 10:42 am, "Martin Burnicki" martin.burnicki@burnicki.net
wrote:

Clint Jay wrote:

Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for
using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology

is

if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can

buy

(obviously you'd need deep pockets).

I just searched for "Pokémon GO GPS spoofing" on the 'net.

Looks like this was just a hack in Android where apps were provided with
a spoofed position from the hack instead of the true position determined
by the GPS/GNSS receiver.

So this is quite a different thing than spoofing the real GPS signals,
and it only affects the devices which have that hack installed.


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No, this was not the software hack, it was done with some rather nice Rohde&Schwarz test equipment. On 14 Aug 2017 10:42 am, "Martin Burnicki" <martin.burnicki@burnicki.net> wrote: > Clint Jay wrote: > > Absolutely, their use of it was for something trivial and my reason for > > using that example was to show how 'simple' and available the technology > is > > if a couple of students could do it with lab equipment that anyone can > buy > > (obviously you'd need deep pockets). > > I just searched for "Pokémon GO GPS spoofing" on the 'net. > > Looks like this was just a hack in Android where apps were provided with > a spoofed position from the hack instead of the true position determined > by the GPS/GNSS receiver. > > So this is quite a different thing than spoofing the real GPS signals, > and it only affects the devices which have that hack installed. > > _______________________________________________ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. >